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Abstract
Scholars working in science and technology studies (STS) have recently argued that we could learn much about the nature of scientific knowledge by paying closer attention to scientific ignorance. Building on the work of Robert Proctor, this paper shows how ignorance can stem from a wide range of selective research choices that incline researchers toward partial, limited understandings of complex phenomena. A recent report produced by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD) serves as the paper’s central case study. After arguing that the forms of selective ignorance illustrated in cases like this one are both socially important and difficult to address, I suggest several strategies for responding to them in a socially responsible manner.
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1. Introduction 
	A number of authors have recently argued that we could learn a great deal about scientific knowledge by paying more attention to the phenomenon of scientific ignorance. Perhaps the most obvious source for this claim is the volume Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (2008), edited by Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger. The book’s essays discuss a wide range of issues, including how the tobacco and petroleum industries have tried to hide information about smoking and climate change, how governments control the flow of knowledge via censorship, and how appeals to ignorance can be used as rhetorical strategies to influence regulatory policy. In parallel with this literature in science studies, scholars of feminism and critical race theory have also been exploring the concept of “epistemologies of ignorance” (see e.g., Sullivan and Tuana 2007; Mills 1997; Tuana 2006). These thinkers emphasize that privileged communities often “construct” ignorance (either deliberately or unintentionally) about the experiences of disadvantaged groups. Along these lines, Miranda Fricker’s recent book Epistemic Injustice (2007) argues that the phenomena of testimonial and hermeneutic injustice often prevent the perspectives of marginalized communities from being heard.
	This paper builds on one particular strand in the growing literature on ignorance. In his introductory essay to the Agnotology volume, Robert Proctor identifies “selective ignorance” as one important form that ignorance can take (2008, 6-8). In order to illustrate this phenomenon, he appeals to Londa Schiebinger’s essay (2008), where she points out that sixteenth-century European explorers brought back some sorts of information from the New World (e.g., about the potato and quinine) but not other sorts of information (e.g., about abortifacients and contraceptives). Based on this example, however, one could get the misleading impression that selective ignorance in science is primarily a consequence of studying some research topics and neglecting others. I contend that it is at least as important to examine how we can become selectively ignorant about different ways of understanding a single, complex research topic or phenomenon. This sort of ignorance can stem from a wide variety of subtle research choices that have recently been highlighted in the science-studies literature: decisions about what questions to ask, what metrics or standards to employ, what concepts to use, what research strategies to pursue, what technological applications to develop, and what information to disseminate. It is important to highlight these factors, because they provide easily missed avenues through which socially important forms of selective ignorance can be perpetuated.  
	The next section of the paper explores the concept of selective ignorance in more detail, showing how it can be illuminated by drawing from the philosophy-of-science literature on scientific pluralism. Section 3 clarifies and sharpens these points by examining the phenomenon of selective ignorance in contemporary agricultural research. It uses an international assessment of agricultural science and technology, Agriculture at a Crossroads (IAASTD 2009a; IAASTD 2009b; IAASTD 2009c), to highlight the wide range of factors that have yielded some forms of agricultural knowledge rather than others. Section 4 then highlights the social ramifications of selective ignorance and suggests a number of strategies for responding to it. While this phenomenon remains difficult to address, the present paper provides a starting point for investigating it further.      	
2. The Nature and Causes of Selective Ignorance
	The concept of selective ignorance employed in this paper stems from the work of Robert Proctor (2008). He suggests a taxonomy of ignorance organized around three categories: (1) ignorance as a starting point or native state; (2) ignorance as a lost realm or selective choice; and (3) ignorance as a strategic ploy or active construct (2008, 3). This is, of course, not the only taxonomy available. For example, Nancy Tuana (2006) has suggested categories such as “knowing that we do not know, but not caring to know”; “we do not even know that we do not know”; “they do not want us to know”; “willful ignorance”; “ignorance produced by the construction of epistemically disadvantaged identities”; and “loving ignorance.”
	This paper focuses on Proctor’s second category, selective ignorance, while acknowledging that it may overlap with both his other taxonomic categories. For example, deciding how to distinguish ignorance as a starting point from ignorance as a selective choice is not an easy matter. Suppose that researchers have not yet begun to investigate a particular cure for cancer, but they have investigated many other cures. One might say that this is a case of ignorance as a starting point, because the researchers have not begun to study this particular cure. However, one might instead categorize it as an instance of selective ignorance, because researchers have studied some cures and not others. In addition to this difficulty, the category of selective ignorance can sometimes merge with the category of ignorance as a strategic ploy or active construct. For example, industry groups may purposely study the beneficial or neutral effects of their products while avoiding research that might yield negative information (see e.g., Elliott 2011, 29-30).
	My goal in this paper is not to draw detailed distinctions between selective ignorance and other categories of ignorance. Instead, my aim is to highlight the wide range of often subtle research choices or “value judgments” that lead to the collection of some forms of knowledge rather than others. I also want to highlight the ways in which the selective ignorance that stems from these choices can promote some socially important policies or perspectives or value systems rather than others (see e.g., Lacey 1999). To understand how this can occur, it may be helpful to draw a comparison to the famous story told by various Eastern religious traditions about six blind men who encounter an elephant. One blind man feels the elephant’s trunk, another one encounters the tail, another one feels its side, and so on. As a result, they come to widely diverging accounts of what an elephant is like. I suggest that something similar can happen when scientists explore some facets of a complex phenomenon while largely ignoring others. To take an example that will be explored further in this paper, Hugh Lacey (1999) has argued that contemporary agricultural research that focuses on developing high-yielding seeds for monocultural production systems provides a much narrower understanding of agricultural production than “agroecological” strategies that study the relationships between production systems and their environmental and social context. Moreover, Lacey insists that the prevailing contemporary approaches to agriculture are not socially “neutral”; they systematically promote some social and economic systems while discouraging others.
While the story of the six blind men and the elephant is suggestive, it might seem too simplistic to shed much light on the nature of selective ignorance in contemporary scientific research. Fortunately, there are a variety of concepts in the scholarly literature that can help in developing a more nuanced picture of how scientific practice yields selective understanding. In the early twentieth century, the influential philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1925) argued that any effort to understand a phenomenon inevitably ends up abstracting from its full complexity and focusing only on specific features of it. He worried that scientists and philosophers tend to assume that their simplified abstractions adequately capture all the nuances of the phenomenon. He dubbed this mistake the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness,” because it is characterized by the false assumption that abstractions accurately mirror all the details of concrete phenomena. More recently, STS scholars have used the anthropological concept of “technoscientific imaginaries” to describe how sets of technical, social, and political-economic forces can focus scientists’ attention, constrain investigations, and mobilize stakeholder interests along particular directions (e.g., Fortun and Fortun 2005; Marcus 1995).  
There are also resources in contemporary philosophy of science for understanding how scientific research can yield selective understandings of phenomena. In particular, a recent body of literature on scientific pluralism has highlighted the fact that researchers can analyze a complex phenomenon using multiple explanatory models, methodologies, conceptual schemes, and disciplinary approaches (see e.g., Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006). For example, in her recent book Unsimple Truths (2009), Sandra Mitchell proposes a philosophy of science that she dubs “integrative pluralism.” Her central idea is that scientific research on any given topic is likely to feature a plurality of perspectives that are brought together through an integration of methods and results (see also Giere 2006). One way of thinking about the present paper is that it highlights many of the important research choices that can contribute to Mitchell’s “plurality of perspectives.” This paper also shows how Mitchell’s account of integrative pluralism can advance our understanding of the relationships between science and society, insofar as different research perspectives can advance the interests of particular social groups.   
To better understand this notion that research perspectives can be socially significant, we can look at an argument that Philip Kitcher makes in his influential book Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001). He claims that there is in fact no privileged way (independent of human capacities and interests) to divide nature into objects and to sort those objects into kinds. Instead, he argues that these activities depend on contingent judgments of what is significant to particular social groups. He illustrates his claims using an analogy to mapmaking: “Map-makers are invariably selective…. [W]e understand how maps designed for different purposes pick out different entities within a region or depict those entities rather differently” (2001, 60). Because science is like map-making—yielding somewhat different results depending on the needs and interests of those doing the work—Kitcher insists that we should be striving to pursue research that accords with societal priorities (which he calls “well-ordered science”).
My own argument has much in common with Kitcher’s work, insofar as we both aim to highlight the contingency of scientific knowledge and the importance of steering it in directions that fit societal priorities. There are at least two important differences, however. First, whereas Kitcher focuses primarily on developing a theoretical account of what well-ordered science would look like, I focus (in Section 4) on proposing practical strategies for developing research that is more responsive to societal priorities. Second, Kitcher addresses a fairly limited range of judgments that impact the contours of scientific knowledge. In particular, his discussion of well-ordered science focuses on three issues: (1) selecting research topics; (2) adopting ethical constraints on scientific methodologies; and (3) choosing particular technological applications to pursue (2001, 118). I want to highlight a wider range of research judgments that can subtly influence how we understand a research domain or phenomenon.
Recent science-studies literature has shown that research is “shot through” with significant value judgments (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Elliott 2011; Kincaid, Dupré, and Wylie 2007). Some of these are fairly well recognized, such as the three crucial judgments mentioned by Kitcher. Others are less obvious. For example, scholars have shown that decisions about how to frame scientific phenomena (including choices about scientific terms and categories) are ethically significant insofar as they can influence the future course of scientific research, alter public attention to a phenomenon, and even affect public policy making (see e.g., Elliott 2009; Elliott 2011; Larson 2011). Others have shown that choices about the metrics and standards used for measuring phenomena are also highly significant (Lampland and Star 2009). For example, when technology assessments focus only on a narrow range of variables (e.g., mortality rates or economic costs and benefits), they can miss important “soft” effects on people’s quality of life or their worldviews (Boenink 2011). The next section identifies a number of crucial judgments highlighted by a recent review of contemporary agricultural research. The goal is to gain a better understanding of the range of factors that can steer research down some pathways while subtly promoting ignorance about other socially important forms of information.      
3. A Case Study: Agriculture at a Crossroads
	This section examines the report Agriculture at a Crossroads (IAASTD 2009b), which was recently published by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD). There are advantages and disadvantages to focusing on a general document like this one rather than studying one or more localized examples of agricultural research. The more localized approach has the potential to yield a richer understanding of how a range of judgments can combine to shape scientific understanding in a specific context. However, this paper takes advantage of the more general view offered by the IAASTD report, which shows how an entire research field can be steered down some paths rather than others, with very important societal consequences.
Overview of the Report 
The IAASTD report was initiated in 2002 by the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in response to a request from agricultural biotechnology companies for advice on the future of genetically modified crops in developing countries (Stokstad 2008). The project was ultimately sponsored by a range of entities including the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). It was designed to be highly inclusive, with a governing bureau consisting of 30 governmental representatives and 30 representatives from civil society (including producers, consumers, NGO’s, and private companies). Hundreds of experts were chosen to participate as authors, and many governments and organizations participated in the peer review process (IAASTD 2009, viii).
	The organizers envisioned a project with similarities to both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Nevertheless, some commentators expressed concerns that its inclusiveness and broad scope resulted in a somewhat platitudinous report rather than the sort of focused summary of current science produced by the IPCC (Stokstad 2008). Proponents of the report have responded that its more inclusive structure was important for bringing the perspectives of the rural poor and of women to the fore. Controversy has also swirled around what some governmental and industry groups regarded as a bias against genetically modified crops in the final report (Stokstad 2008). As a result, some industry figures backed out of the process, and governments such as the United States, Canada, and Australia provided only partial support for the final documents (Stokstad 2008). Despite these limitations and debates, the report provides a very helpful analysis of the current contours of agricultural science and technology, and it highlights how some kinds of information have been pursued more aggressively than others. Therefore, it is ideal for the purposes of this paper.
One should note, of course, that the IAASTD report is not unique in highlighting the selective aspects of agricultural science and practice. Throughout the twentieth century, a number of figures questioned the increasing dominance of “industrial” approaches to agriculture and called for attention to alternative, more locally adapted strategies. Some of these critiques came from agricultural scientists such as Sir Albert Howard, while others came from social scientists and humanists such as Ken Dahlberg (1979), Keith Griffin (1974), Jack Kloppenburg (1988), and Paul Thompson (Thompson and Stout 1991). The IAASTD report provides an influential synthesis of many of these concerns, and the present paper shows how they can be analyzed more fruitfully by conceptualizing them as examples of selective ignorance. The remainder of this section highlights some of the important research judgments that are discussed in the IAASTD document. 
Choice of Questions
	One of the important judgments that can contribute to blocking some forms of knowledge and encouraging others is the choice of questions, and the authors of Agriculture at a Crossroads are particularly sensitive to this issue. The report’s Global Summary for Decision Makers notes that recent agricultural research has tended to focus on the question of how to maximize the production of individual agricultural products (IAASTD 2009a, 16; see also Perfecto, Vandermeer, and Wright 2009, 6). In contrast, the central organizing question of the report is much broader: “How can AKST [agricultural knowledge, science, and technology] be used to reduce hunger and poverty, improve rural livelihoods, and promote equitable environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable development” (IAASTD 2009a, 3)? 
In his book Is Science Value Free? (1999, 187-196), Hugh Lacey has previously emphasized that these sorts of foundational questions are value-laden insofar as they can yield knowledge that promotes some forms of social organization and harms others. Both Lacey and the IAASTD note that when agricultural research focuses primarily on maximizing production (often with heavy irrigation, fertilizer, and pesticide use), it can perpetuate a state of relative ignorance about the multiplicity of negative side-effects that accrue on other natural resources, including forests and fisheries. Given that these additional resources are often central to the livelihood of subsistence farmers in developing countries, this state of selective ignorance can contribute to enhancing some aspects of agriculture (specifically, the production of individual commodities) while producing a net loss in quality of life for these poor farmers (see also Shiva 1991).
	Another crucial way in which the choice of questions can contribute to selective ignorance is by steering society’s responses to a problem toward scientific or technical fixes rather than social or political solutions. Thus, before scientists even begin to formulate their own specific questions about a research topic, a significant and value-laden decision may already have been made tacitly by citizens or policy makers—namely, the decision to treat the problem primarily as a set of questions for scientists and engineers to address. For example, the IAASTD emphasizes that there are a number of non-technical solutions to agricultural problems: increasing poor farmers’ security of access to land, promoting more transparent and high-functioning markets, and providing better social safety nets (IAASTD 2009c, 22). Raj Patel emphasizes the same points in his book Stuffed and Starved (2007). He notes that the U.S. pushed very strongly in the 1960’s to address the problem of hunger in India as a set of technical problems to be addressed with Green Revolution technologies (see also Dahlberg 1979). This was largely because the major alternative solutions (e.g., redistributing land to make it available to poor peasants) sounded far too much like a Red Revolution, which seemed untenable during the height of the Cold War (Patel 2007, 121-124). The upshot is that even if scientists are circumspect about the questions that they ask about agricultural issues, society may already be suffering from a form of selective ignorance by exploring these problems primarily in a scientific mode rather than in a social or political mode.   
	One might object that it is misleading to describe this selectivity about research questions as a genuine example of ignorance. After all, small farmers and activist groups are often acutely aware of both the negative externalities associated with agriculture and the political solutions to supposedly technical agricultural problems. Moreover, we have seen that various intellectuals have been raising concerns about contemporary agriculture throughout the twentieth century. Therefore, one might insist that the crucial problem is not ignorance but rather the political difficulty of drawing the attention of powerful decision makers to the knowledge of marginalized groups. But this highlights an important point about ignorance: the important question is not simply whether something is known but also who knows it and whether this knowledge is adequately reflected in the decision making techniques employed by those in power. Selective ignorance is important to emphasize even if it is not a matter of complete ignorance but rather a matter of the relative attention given to particular forms of information and research pathways. 
Metrics and Standards 
Another form of judgment that can perpetuate selective ignorance in science and that is highlighted in the IAASTD report is the choice of metrics, standards, and other measures. One of the most well-known examples of how metrics can promote selective ignorance, not only in agriculture but throughout public-policy making, is the use of gross domestic product (GDP) to measure the health of an economy. GDP is a measure of the market value of all goods and services produced by a country. However, as numerous critics have pointed out, it can be very misleading when used to draw inferences about the well-being of a society. For example, it does not reflect inequities within a population, it does not reflect the ways in which economic production may be depleting natural resources, and it does not consider whether the production of goods and services is directed toward relatively undesirable purposes such as healing diseases caused by environmental pollution. 
Because of these sorts of worries, the IAASTD emphasizes that “Measurements of returns to investments [in AKST] require indices that give more information than GDP, and that are sensitive to environmental and equity gains” (2009a, 7). Moreover, even when steps have been taken to measure the impacts of agriculture on the environment and on people’s livelihoods, the report emphasizes that there is still very little information about the tradeoffs and relationships between these various measures (IAASTD 2009b, 385-386). There are also numerous more detailed cases where specific measures are misleading. The IAASTD notes that efforts to measure poor people’s quantity of food intake are problematic unless they also consider the quality of the food (e.g., the presence of important micronutrients) (IAASTD 2009a, 9). Finally, as new problems such as climate change arise, it becomes important to create new measures that clarify how various forms of agriculture can both contribute to and mitigate these problems (IAASTD 2009c, 21). Thus, the choice of a metric can highlight particular pieces of information about a complex phenomenon such as agricultural production while simultaneously hiding or inhibiting attention to other socially important pieces of information.
Research Strategies
The foregoing concerns about the ways that research questions and metrics can hide or prevent the acquisition of important information are closely related to a more general research choice that can contribute to selective ignorance in science. Both Hugh Lacey (1999) and Vandana Shiva (1988) have previously argued that agriculture can be studied from the perspective of very different research strategies (see also, e.g., Dahlberg 1979 and Kloppenburg 1988). While the notion of a research strategy can be somewhat vague and ill-defined, Lacey claims that strategies influence science in two major ways: they constrain data collection and they guide theory development (1999, 205-212). In other words, a research strategy directs scientists toward collecting some forms of data rather than others and developing particular sorts of models or theories rather than others. Both Lacey and Shiva worry that the dominant agricultural research strategies at present focus on developing a narrow biological understanding of the genetics of seeds and how those seeds can be manipulated to increase yield. These research strategies do not encourage more interdisciplinary efforts to integrate ecological, biological, and social information (Lacey 1999, 189-193; see also Shiva 1988).
This clash between different research strategies can be seen in a comparison that the IAASTD makes between local, site-specific agricultural approaches (which tend to be based on agroecological insights) versus more general approaches (which tend to draw on high-input technologies). The report offers at least two reasons for thinking that strategies focused on local, site-specific innovation are preferable, even though they have been comparatively neglected in contemporary research. First, “In small-scale, diversified farming systems suitable technologies are typically highly site-specific … and systems improvements need to be developed locally, in response to diverse contexts” (IAASTD 2009b, 379). The IAASTD regards these small-scale, diversified farming systems as the most socially and environmentally promising. Therefore, in order to achieve the report’s goals of alleviating rural poverty and promoting environmentally sustainable development, it calls for pursuing site-specific agricultural technologies that fit local contexts. The second reason for pursuing site-specific agricultural research is that it is more likely to yield systemic improvements in current practices. As the IAASTD puts it, “In the future, research addressing single problems will probably become less relevant…. It will probably be more promising to develop innovations that address several factors simultaneously … and which will therefore be more context and site specific” (2009b, 380).
Because the IAASTD calls for developing locally appropriate agricultural strategies, it provides a fairly pessimistic evaluation of current agricultural research. At one point, the authors lament, “It is questionable if AKST will have the capacity to respond to the multiple needs of small-scale diversified farming systems (2009b, 349). The report emphasizes that the high-input agricultural strategies that characterize so much contemporary agricultural research are especially inappropriate in “less-favored” agricultural regions (IAASTD 2009b, 380). However, the authors do offer some hope. They emphasize that if researchers are willing to promote more participatory research strategies (thereby incorporating data and insights from a broader range of sources than typical scientific research), they may be able to help generate locally appropriate innovations. In sum, “The challenge for AKST will be to find ways for combining local knowledge with innovations developed in similar other contexts to generate locally adapted new options” (2009b, 380, 384). Thus, the IAASTD encourages what Lacey (1999) would regard as an alternative to the research strategies that are currently dominant: it calls for data generated through participatory interaction with local farmers, and it calls for the development of models and techniques that fit local social and environmental contexts.
Information Dissemination
In addition to choices about research questions, metrics, and strategies, the IAASTD report highlights a crucial judgment that occurs once research projects have already been chosen and performed—what information to disseminate and how aggressively to do so. This issue surfaces in the report when it discusses public suspicions about the genetic modification (GM) of crops. The authors note, “For transgenic approaches to continue to make significant contributions in the long term, a substantial increase in public confidence in safety assessments will be needed” (2009b, 394). However, the report also cautions that this increase in confidence is unlikely to occur as long as the agricultural biotechnology industry continues to maintain tight proprietary control over all research on GM seeds (IAASTD 2009b, 394). The public understandably worries that the biotechnology industry is much more likely to publish and aggressively advertise positive information about the benefits of GM technology than it is to publish negative information about the risks of GM. Thus, as we have already seen, the phenomenon of selective ignorance can be a problem even if some individuals are not ignorant. Even if a wide body of information is available to a small number of scientists and corporate executives, it may still be socially problematic if only a small selection of that available information is widely known and discussed in the political sphere.​[1]​   
One might object that these worries about information dissemination are of limited importance, because they do not seem to be inherent to science; they seem to arise only when industry groups employ crude tactics to hide information. But this objection is too quick. First, judgments about how and whether to disseminate particular sorts of information arise even without industry pressure. The problem of publication bias illustrates this point. Regulators and policy makers have become concerned that many pharmaceuticals appear to be more effective in the biomedical literature than they really are, because positive results are more likely to be published than negative results. Crucially, this occurs not only because of the influence of the pharmaceutical industry but also because researchers may not bother to submit negative or inconclusive results and because journals may be less interested in publishing them (see e.g., Easterbrook et al. 1991; Dickerson 1990). Moreover, even if the phenomenon of publication bias were primarily caused by industry pressure, it would still illustrate that judgments about how to disseminate information have extremely important social effects that should not be ignored. To take just one example, some authors claim that the entire biomedical community has been misled about the effectiveness of antidepressant drugs, in part because large numbers of inconclusive studies have been suppressed while a small number of positive studies have been widely disseminated (Angell 2011). This is part of a much broader effort by the pharmaceutical industry to control the flow of information about its products by designing strategic studies, ghostwriting favorable articles, commissioning publications, and advertising aggressively (see e.g., Elliott 2011, 83-87; Sismondo 2004).
Additional Judgments
There are additional research judgments that one can identify in the IAASTD report. For example, the choice of particular terms and categories can highlight some pieces of information while diminishing attention to others. The report’s authors note that they like to use the term ‘multifunctional’ when they describe agriculture, because this term draws attention to the fact that agriculture ideally performs a greater number of social roles than merely providing food (IAASTD 2009a, 4). Another crucial judgment is how to push new technological applications forward, given that they can yield very different sorts of practical knowledge. For example, the authors of the IAASTD lament that, because of intellectual property rights, local farmers are unlikely to be able to engage in the sorts of participatory research with GM seeds that would be needed in order to develop truly effective, locally appropriate technological innovations.
Rather than exploring these further research judgments, however, I want to turn to the question of how we can respond to the various sorts of selective ignorance generated by these research choices. The IAASTD report very eloquently presents the need for this sort of reflection: 
AKST arrangements involve ethical choices and value judgments. Some judgments have been privileged over others in AKST decision making. They have helped push formal AKST along certain pathways  to the neglect of other well-evidenced options, some originating in traditional knowledge or civil society experience, that are more focused on the multiple roles of agriculture. (2009c, 19)
The next section of this paper asks what we can do to push agricultural research and other policy-relevant areas of science toward revealing forms of knowledge that could be beneficial to broad swaths of the public but that would otherwise receive limited attention.                             
4. Responding to Selective Ignorance
Before directly discussing how to respond to selective ignorance, it is important to clarify that not all ignorance is bad. As individuals, it is very helpful to cut down on the range of facts that we need to know by dividing our cognitive labor with other people; we each specialize in some forms of knowledge while remaining ignorant of others. There may also be some sorts of information that we would prefer for society as a whole to ignore. As Philip Kitcher emphasizes, one can imagine plausible scenarios in which people would be happier if they held mistaken beliefs about human nature or about religion (2001, 150-152). Even when it comes to public policy making, Daniel Sarewitz (2004) emphasizes that we often overestimate the value of knowledge (see also Pielke 2010). We are inclined to think that increasing our knowledge will help to resolve political disagreements about how to respond to difficult issues like climate change. In contrast, Sarewitz contends that when we face significant political disagreements, there will generally be enough complexity in the available scientific evidence that different political groups can interpret the available information in ways that serve their interests. Thus, Sarewitz argues that we would do well to focus more on having productive debates about values and less on trying to obtain decisive forms of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, while it is important to be reminded that knowledge is not always helpful, there are certainly many cases in which it is helpful. Moreover, even if scholars like Sarewitz are correct that we should be paying more attention to disputes about values, our values do not exist in a vacuum; they are influenced by our scientific understanding of the world and of ourselves (Lacey 1999). Thus, by collecting some forms of knowledge and not others (and making some forms of knowledge salient to powerful decision makers rather than others), we can either consciously or unconsciously advance some political interests and value orientations rather than others. This is particularly obvious in the agricultural context. The research choices discussed in Section 3 have at least two important social effects: (1) they influence society’s awareness of the environmental and social problems associated with current agricultural practices; and (2) they influence whether specific alternatives to current agriculture appear feasible and important.
Unfortunately, one of the major take-away lessons of this paper is that selective ignorance is difficult to address in a socially responsible manner. First, important forms of selective ignorance may be particularly difficult to recognize. Whereas it may be fairly obvious that scientists have not even begun to investigate a particular research domain, it may be much less clear that, say, the metrics or questions emphasized in a particular domain are hiding important forms of information that would be valuable to obtain. A second challenge is that it may be particularly difficult to criticize efforts to maintain selective ignorance, even when they are employed as part of a conscious strategy by vested interest groups. For example, it would be obvious that a chemical company acted unethically if it refused to disclose information about the harmful effects of its products. However, criticizing the company would be more complicated if it merely designed its studies in ways that reduced the likelihood of uncovering harmful effects.       
Given these two difficulties, I suggest that we look for ways of responding to selective ignorance by asking two questions: (1) how can we assist in identifying socially important forms of selective ignorance that would otherwise be difficult to recognize; and (2) how can we motivate actors to alleviate socially important forms of selective ignorance that they would not otherwise be motivated to address? Note that these questions focus on identifying and alleviating socially important forms of selective ignorance. It is inevitable that our scientific investigations will always be highly selective—we simply cannot study everything. The problems that this paper aims to address occur when scientific investigations that could contribute significantly to public goods are ignored in favor of scientific approaches that benefit a narrow range of interest groups.​[2]​ There are a host of factors that can contribute to this problem: disciplinary constraints (e.g., pressure to produce science that can be published in disciplinary journals), institutional factors (e.g., the structures of academic departments that inhibit fruitful collaborations), social and cultural factors (e.g., sexism and racism), and economic considerations (e.g., corporate efforts to increase profits). Given this complex range of contributing factors, it is important to pursue a wide range of strategies for identifying socially important forms of selective ignorance and motivating responses to them.
Identifying Selective Ignorance
For the sake of simplicity, I will organize strategies for identifying selective ignorance into two general groups: (1) political strategies; and (2) academic strategies. It is important to start with political strategies, because those who write on the topic of ignorance are keen to emphasize that it is a highly political phenomenon (see e.g., Proctor and Schiebinger 2008; Sullivan and Tuana 2007; Tuana 2006). Whether the dominance of privileged social groups is associated with economics, race, or gender, they frequently exploit ignorance to maintain their power. Thus, political strategies are needed in response. 
The IAASTD report illustrates how a combination of social activism and formal deliberation can make a difference in the political sphere. In recent years, a wide variety of peasant movements and NGO’s (e.g., La Via Campesina, the Landless Rural Workers Movement, the Rodale Institute, the People’s Grocery, Greenpeace, Navdanya International, etc.) have been highlighting the plight of poor farmers and calling for more emphasis on alternative paths for agricultural research (see e.g., Patel 2007; Shiva 1992; Perfecto, Vandermeer, and Wright 2009). By drawing international attention to many of the shortcomings associated with current agricultural research, they helped to create the impetus for the IAASTD. Moreover, some of these groups were able to provide experts who could represent their perspectives in the formal deliberative exercises that led to the final report (Stokstad 2008). 
An extensive literature has recently discussed the advantages and disadvantages of these sorts of formal deliberative processes (e.g., Elliott 2011; Guston 1999; Jasanoff 1990; Renn, Webler, and Wiedemann 1995). On one hand, deliberation can contribute to more democratically legitimate, more thoughtful, and more publicly acceptable decisions (Fiorino 1990; NRC 1996). On the other hand, deliberative forums can degenerate into strategically framed efforts to martial public support for predetermined policies (Joss and Durant 1995). In the case of the IAASTD, it appears that the final report was fairly successful in drawing attention to numerous ways in which current agricultural approaches disadvantage already marginalized groups, especially women and the rural poor. Thus, activist groups helped contribute to the creation and activities of the IAASTD, and it has in turn assisted these groups by providing an internationally recognized document that legitimizes many of their concerns.  
In addition to political strategies like the development of social movements and formal deliberative bodies, there are also academic approaches for identifying socially important forms of selective ignorance. Many of these strategies involve efforts to break down disciplinary boundaries that promote limited perspectives and blind spots (i.e., selective ignorance!) and to replace them with more interdisciplinary approaches (see e.g., Frodeman, Klein, and Mitcham 2010). One way to challenge narrow disciplinary perspectives is to engage in the thoughtful monitoring of “real-world experiments.” Various STS scholars have emphasized that the introduction of a new technology (e.g., cell phones, GM crops, nuclear power plants, or nanomaterials) is essentially a large-scale experiment in the real world (see e.g., Krohn and Weingart 1987). An advantage of conceptualizing new technologies this way is that it highlights how foolhardy it is to engage in these sorts of experiments without carefully monitoring to learn more about their consequences. An important benefit is that if monitoring is performed thoroughly enough to uncover unforeseen consequences, it can help researchers to identify new forms of information that should be pursued. For example, efforts to track the health of various animal populations during the 1980’s ultimately led to the realization that a variety of industrial chemicals were disrupting the endocrine systems of these organisms (Colborn et al. 1996). As a result, it became clear that traditional disciplinary perspectives (which focused primarily on whether industrial chemicals produced cancer) were likely to leave us ignorant of other highly significant effects associated with their endocrine disrupting properties.        
Another approach for opening academic research to new perspectives is to bring social scientists and their perspectives to bear on the work of natural scientists. One example of this approach is the Arizona State University STIR (Socio-Technical Integration Research) project (see e.g., Fisher and Mahajan 2010). Over the course of the STIR project, social scientists work with natural scientists to probe why they employ particular materials, techniques, questions, and study designs. As well as promoting a variety of other goals, this questioning can ideally highlight research choices that are foreclosing socially important methodologies and research avenues. Much contemporary STS scholarship has a similar aim. Many historians, philosophers, and social scientists regard their work as an effort to uncover implicit value judgments in scientific research (Elliott 2011). By doing so, they can promote public deliberation about ways in which these judgments contribute to socially important forms of selective ignorance. Thus, these academic strategies can feed back into the political approaches discussed earlier in this section.
Motivating Alternative Forms of Knowledge
In addition to the difficulty of identifying socially important forms of selective ignorance, the other challenge is motivating research that addresses these forms of ignorance. Fortunately, many of the strategies that we have already discussed for identifying selective ignorance can also play a motivating role. For example, political movements and activism can influence the research agenda set by both governments and private entities. Academic strategies do not have as much obvious motivating force. Nevertheless, insofar as the scientific community already tends to be motivated to promote the public good, it may be helpful in some cases just to highlight the fact that alternative research choices merit consideration. The crucial remaining difficulty is that even if scientists have the best of intentions, their research choices are constrained by a multitude of factors, especially the need to obtain research funding. 
Therefore, an additional strategy for motivating research that addresses socially significant forms of selective ignorance is to influence the allocation of research funds. The IAASTD report itself emphasizes the importance of funding: “[A]gricultural research increasingly involves the private sector, but the focus of such research is seldom on the needs of the poor or in public goods” (2009b, 224). Many authors have noted that even academic research on agriculture tends to be heavily funded by private industry, with the consequence that it emphasizes high-input, high-technology approaches that can be patented (Thompson 1995). In response, the IAASTD report suggests that “More government funding and better targeted government investments in AKST in developing countries can contribute in a major way to meeting development and sustainability goals” (2009c, 26). The authors especially encourage funding schemes that advance its goal of encouraging participatory research strategies focused closely on local farmers’ needs. For example, they call for “the provision of R&D funds to research users for contracting services from AKST suppliers” (2009c, 26). A variety of other scholars have also suggested approaches for altering patent schemes or creating prizes in order to give private sector entities more incentive to pursue research that promotes the public good (see e.g., Hollis and Pogge 2008; Reiss and Kitcher 2008).    	
5. Conclusions
	This paper has explored the nature and consequences of selective ignorance in science. It highlighted how choices about what questions to ask, what metrics or standards to employ, what research strategies to pursue, what sorts of information to disseminate, and numerous other judgments can selectively influence the contours of scientific knowledge. Section 3 showed how, in a domain like agricultural research, these choices can influence our awareness of the consequences of our current activities as well as altering our perceptions of the plausibility of various alternatives. Section 4 argued that even socially significant forms of selective ignorance can be difficult to address, because the choices that contribute to such ignorance may be difficult to recognize and to criticize. In order to increase awareness of crucial research choices, Section 4 suggested both political and academic approaches. It emphasized that many of these strategies could also be useful for motivating research choices that alleviate socially significant forms of selective ignorance, but funding schemes are also particularly important to consider in this regard. Ideally, greater awareness of the complexity and social importance of selective ignorance will promote the development of more effective strategies for responding to it.
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^1	  This worry that information may be available to a small range of individuals but not to society as a whole seems especially pertinent given Peter Galison’s (2008) recent research on classified knowledge. He notes that each year there is more information that becomes classified than there is that becomes publicly available!
^2	  Admittedly, there are likely to be significant disagreements about whether particular approaches to science genuinely promote public goods or whether they primarily benefit a small number of interest groups. Fortunately, many of the strategies discussed here (e.g., political activism and deliberative forums) can be employed not only for steering science toward public goods but also for identifying public goods. In fact, even those who are skeptical about the feasibility of identifying genuine “public goods” might argue that the best we can do is to employ democratic strategies like promoting political activism and deliberative forums for steering scientific research. For further discussion of science and its contribution to public goods, see Callon (1994) and Stengel et al. (2009).  
